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 1 
DELEGATING PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
MISSIONS—BUT TO WHOM? 
WHAT THE U.N.’S RECENT 
RECOMMENDATION REVEALS ABOUT 
TODAY’S CRISIS IN LEGITIMATE ACTORS FOR 
ROBUST PEACE OPERATIONS 
Karima Tawfik* 
Introduction 
On June 17, 2015, under the instructions of Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon, the United Nations (U.N.) reviewed its peace operations and 
submitted its findings to member states. The report, titled “Report of the 
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our 
Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership, and People,” recommends—
among an array of other reforms—that the Security Council move away 
from authorizing peace operations conducted entirely through the U.N. and, 
instead, delegate peace operations in situations of sustained armed conflict to 
non-U.N. actors, such as regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions of 
member states.1 
This recent recommendation by the U.N. panel is a symbol of today’s 
crisis in peace operations, which arises from the lack of legitimate actors to 
conduct robust peacekeeping missions—that is, those peace operations 
conducted in “environments with no peace to keep”2 or in “situations of 
violent conflict and in the absence of a viable peace process.”3 In such 
instances of sustained armed conflict, the U.N. has increasingly authorized 
 
 * J.D., December 2015, University of Michigan Law School. Winner of the Michigan 
Law Review First Impressions Writing Competition 2016. I would like to thank Professor 
Monica Hakimi for her guidance on this Essay and for her course, the Use of Force in 
International Law, which provided the subject-matter background on peacekeeping missions. 
 1. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths 
for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, para.118, U.N. Doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446 (June 17, 
2015) [hereinafter Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel]. 
 2. Id. at 12; see also Mateja Peter, Between Doctrine and Practice: The U.N. 
Peacekeeping Dilemma, 21 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 351, 356 (2015) (“[T]he Security Council 
is increasingly becoming more willing to deploy peacekeepers where there is no peace to 
keep.”). 
 3. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at 43. 
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“offensive force,”4 such as targeted offensive operations to “degrade, 
neutralize or defeat an opponent,”5 in missions that are “increasingly bearing 
a resemblance to the stabilization missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.”6 
According to Mateja Peter, such U.N. peace operations are “erasing the line 
between peacekeeping”7—that is, those missions that seek to maintain a 
secure environment, deter the resumption of violence, provide a secure space 
for the advancement of the political process, and protect civilians8—and 
“peace enforcement”—missions that enforce political solutions through 
offensive use of force (such as target combat operations)9 and without the 
consent of all parties to the conflict.10 
This Essay argues that in assessing whether or not to move towards the 
U.N. panel’s proposed model that champions regional actors and ad hoc 
coalitions over the U.N. itself, the international community must weigh the 
marginal costs and benefits of this plan. This essay follows the U.N. panel’s 
call for the international community to derive lessons from the past11 by 
examining three case studies where regional actors and ad hoc coalitions, 
rather than the U.N., have embarked on peace enforcement missions. It 
argues that if the international community chooses to follow the U.N. 
panel’s recommendation on deferring to regional actors or ad hoc coalitions, 
it should prepare for fewer peace enforcement operations, of shorter 
duration, and at times motivated by regional politicking. The international 
community should also be aware that the benefits of the panel’s 
recommendation—swift and decisive action and a somewhat increased 
ability for the U.N. to adhere to its principles of consent, impartiality, and 
nonuse of force—will be counter-balanced by fewer controls on regional 
actors’ profiteering and human rights abuses and a lack of guarantee as to 
the length of the mission. 
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, the Essay will examine the 
proposed method’s impact on the U.N.’s ability to return to defensive and 
impartial tasks in the midst of conflict, that is, the likelihood that the U.N. 
 
 4. Id. para. 121. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Peter, supra note 2, at 352. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 106. 
 9. Peter, supra note 2, at 352–54, 360. 
 10. Id. at 358. (“UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to be deployed with the 
consent of the main parties to the conflict. This distinguishes them from enforcement 
operations . . . [C]onsent is missing in contemporary operations, mainly because 
comprehensive peace agreements are lacking.”) 
 11. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 133. 
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will satisfy its principles of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force 
following other actors’ interventions. Then, the Essay will evaluate the 
proposal’s impact on other metrics of successful peace enforcement 
operations: the ability to enforce peace swiftly, in conformity with 
international human rights and laws-of-war principles, and with adequate 
capacity to bring an end to hostilities.12 
To control for variables that may lead to more difficult peace 
enforcement challenges, this Essay only tracks peace enforcement operations 
where the host state’s government invited a regional organization or ad hoc 
coalition to conduct the peace enforcement operation. This analysis will 
draw upon operations by the Economic Community of West African States 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia, by the Southern African Development 
Community in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho, and 
by an ad hoc coalition of francophone African countries, Mission 
Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui, in the Central African 
Republic. This Essay focuses on these operations because they represent 
some of the few peace enforcement operations executed outside the auspices 
of the U.N. and with the invitation of the host state’s government. 
I. Ad Hoc Coalitions and Regional Actors as First Responders: 
Protecting the U.N.’s Role in Defensive and Impartial Tasks? 
In her recent article on the U.N.’s peacekeeping dilemma, Mateja Peter 
describes the classic peacekeeping doctrine as one in which the U.N. plays a 
role in “defensive and impartial tasks” such as protecting civilians and 
supporting post-conflict processes and mediation.13 This model reflects the 
basic principles of U.N. peacekeeping as developed through the Brahimi 
Report14 and the “Capstone Doctrine”15: consent, impartiality, and nonuse of 
 
 12. This Essay evaluates only the panel’s recommendation to defer robust peace 
operations to regional actors or ad hoc coalitions; it does not seek to evaluate the many 
beneficial recommendations that the panel discusses at length in its report, such as ensuring 
that the U.N. uses its convening power to prevent and mediate conflict and to assist in political 
solutions, Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at 10–11, that it create a rapid 
response U.N. team to establish initial mission presence and to reinforce missions in crisis, id. 
at 13, and that it move away from U.N. Headquarter–focused policies toward a field-focused 
administrative framework. Id. at 15. 
 13. Peter, supra note 2, 366–67 (2015). 
 14. The Brahimi Report, Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. 
Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report], named after 
Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, was 
unanimously adopted by the Security Council on November 13, 2000, and contained 
recommendations regarding peacekeeping operations. “Brahimi Report”: Report of the Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml [https://perma.cc/YUD8-
FAUR]. The report was a culmination of efforts by the U.N. to assess the shortcomings of the 
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force (except in self-defense).16 As Peter describes, U.N. peacekeeping 
operations are supposed to be deployed with these three principles because, 
in the absence of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force principles, a 
U.N. peace operation might struggle to carry out its basic functions,17 present 
itself as a neutral party in peace negotiations,18 or maintain legitimacy 
among local populations.19 
Yet, U.N. peace operations have recently forfeited such principles for 
more robust peace-operation mandates, as described by the U.N. panel and 
Peter.20 The U.N. panel stated in a 2015 report that “[t]oday, several United 
Nations missions are effectively being called upon to undertake a conflict 
management role”21 and to conduct “stabilization”22 missions that “support 
the extension or restoration of State authority.”23 Peter describes the Security 
Council’s move away from the traditional model in spring 2013, when it 
expanded the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in the DRC to include 
offensive combat. Specifically, the Security Council authorized a “force 
intervention brigade” within the existing U.N. Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) mission 
structure to push back the Tutsi March 23 (M23) militia in the east and 
directed U.N. peacekeepers to assist Congolese forces in fighting armed 
groups.24 These directives explicitly compromise the U.N.’s historically 
impartial role. As Peter states, “the types of activities that U.N. peacekeepers 
are mandated to perform imply that the U.N. is engaged in a battle in 
coalition with the Congolese government, the same government that the 
U.N. and other international actors have repeatedly criticized for condoning 
serious abuses by its military against civilians.”25 As the DRC mission 
 
U.N.’s then-existing peace operations that had led to the failure of the U.N. to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1995. Id. 
 15. In 2008, the U.N. released the Capstone Doctrine, U.N. Secretariat, Dep’t of 
Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines, (2008) [hereinafter Capstone Doctrine], which outlined the most important 
principles and guidelines for U.N. peacekeepers in the field. 
 16. Brahimi Report, supra note 14, para. 48; Capstone Doctrine, supra note 15, at 31. 
 17. Peter, supra note 2, at 358. 
 18. Id. at 364. 
 19. See id. at 360. 
 20. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
 21. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, at para. 113. 
 22. Id. para. 114. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Peter, supra note 2, at 354. 
 25. Id. 
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demonstrates, the robust U.N. mandate threatens to compromise U.N. 
credibility in the eyes of civilian populations and on the international stage. 
Why did the U.N. move toward engaging in partial actions on the 
international stage? The U.N. panel stated in a 2015 report that while it is 
“convinced of the importance” of the core principles, “[a]t the same time, 
the Panel stresses its concern that the principles of peacekeeping should 
never be used as an excuse for failure to protect civilians or defend the 
mission proactively.”26 The panel noted the U.N.’s “determination to 
respond even-handedly to the actions of different parties” to the conflict and 
ultimately calls for a “flexible and progressive interpretation of U.N. 
principles.”27 These statements seem to demonstrate that the panel is torn 
between its capacity constraints and its sense of obligation in instances 
where there are “obvious aggressors and victims,”28 such as the Rwandan 
genocide or the massacre of civilians at Srebrenica, which led to the 
adoption of a more robust peace enforcement mandate in the first place.29 In 
promoting a greater role for non-U.N. actors in carrying out peace 
operations, the U.N. panel appears to seek some type of third option to 
ensure a response to protect civilians during ongoing hostilities while 
simultaneously retreating to more modest peacekeeping mandates. 
So could ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional organizations 
provide the best of both worlds by proactively protecting civilians in the 
midst of ongoing hostilities and preserving the U.N.’s role as an impartial 
body that can focus on peacekeeping, post-conflict assistance, and 
humanitarian aid? Through the examples below, this Essay examines 
whether ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional actors acting as the 
first responders to conflicts in the past have preserved this aspirational role 
of the U.N. This Section aims to shed light on whether or not deferring to 
such actors will increase the U.N.’s conformity with the peacekeeping pillars 
of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force, as the U.N. panel hopes. This 
Section gleans lessons from the interventions of the Economic Community 
of West African States in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Southern African 
Development Community in the DRC, and the ad hoc Mission Interafricaine 
de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui coalition in the Central African 
Republic. 
All of these interventions by ad hoc coalitions and regional 
organizations present a more nuanced picture of the likelihood of insulating 
the U.N. from the negative aspects of peace operations. Concerning the 
goals of remaining impartial and of laying the foundation for all parties to 
 
 26. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 125. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. para. 126.  
 29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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the conflict to consent to U.N. presence, for example, consider the U.N. 
intervention in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African 
States played a combat role in the Sierra Leonean war for two years, until 
the war came to a close with the formation of the Lomé Peace Accord in 
July 1999 between President Ahmad Kabbah and the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) rebels.30 Nevertheless, all parties to the Sierra Leonean conflict 
still did not consent to the next phase of peacekeeping and peace-building. In 
October 1999, the U.N. created the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), a mission intended to facilitate the implementation of the 
Lomé peace agreement.31 But in “UNAMSIL’s baptism of fire” in May 
2000, the RUF killed several U.N. personnel and prevented the deployment 
of UNAMSIL to the eastern provinces of the country.32 Seeking to use their 
leverage to weaken the Sierra Leonean state, RUF rebels held 500 U.N. 
troops hostage, and seized their heavy weapons and vehicles.33 One account 
posits that the rebels were “seeking to exploit the vacuum created by the 
departure of Nigerian [i.e., Economic Community of West African States–
affiliated] peacekeepers from Sierra Leone.”34 Although the U.N. refers to 
UNAMSIL as a success story in peacekeeping, that “may serve as a model 
for successful” operations,35 the transition from the Economic Community of 
West African States operation to the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone does not 
demonstrate a neat picture of first responders paving the way for consent and 
nonuse of force by U.N. troops. In fact, it was not until 1,200 British troops 
arrived in Sierra Leone to protect Freetown, provide much-needed back up 
to UNAMSIL, and arrest the RUF commander that the war came to an end.36 
It is true, however, that much of the ambivalence civilians felt toward 
the Economic Community of West African States and its troops—which 
 
 30. See Adekeye Adebajo & David Keen, Sierra Leone in UNITED NATIONS 
INTERVENTIONISM, 1991–2004 246, 257 (Mats Berdal & Spyros Economides eds., 2007). 
Lomé made the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, vice-president and gave him the chairmanship of 
the highly coveted Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources because “there 
seemed few alternatives left for President Kabbah whose Nigerian protectors [referring to 
Nigerian troops of ECOWAS] were withdrawing amidst lackluster international support for 
Sierra Leone.” Id. at 257. 
 31. Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3RC-WMXP]. 
 32.  See Adebajo & Keen, supra note 30, at 261. 
 33.  Id. at 261–62. The RUF commander also reportedly referred to the U.N. 
peacekeepers as “paper tigers.” Id. at 262. 
 34. Id. at 261. 
 35. Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Background, supra note 31. 
 36. The takeaways from relying the British military, or other well-equipped militaries, 
are discussed in more detail in Part II, infra. 
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many regarded as heroes who saved their country from ruin, while others 
saw the peacekeepers as a largely Nigerian army of occupiers37—did not 
transfer to perceptions of UNAMSIL, which has largely been regarded as 
successful.38 UNAMSIL was able to “disarm[] and demobilize[] more than 
75,000 ex-fighters, including child soldiers. . . . [and] helped organize Sierra 
Leone’s first ever free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections by 
providing logistics and public information support.”39 Thus, perhaps regional 
organizations as first responders do protect the efficacy of later, more 
modest U.N. peace operations. The proposition that the Economic 
Community of West African States as the first responder wholly paved the 
way for the U.N. to come into Sierra Leone on the basis of consent and 
nonuse of force, however, is not rooted in the history of the initial transition, 
which was far more volatile and contested. 
The experience of the Southern African Development Community in the 
DRC provides an example of how regional organizations may only 
marginally increase the perceived impartiality of U.N. peacekeeping forces 
that arrive after the conflict has come to a formal close through a peace 
agreement. In response to an invasion from Rwanda and Uganda that they 
feared would threaten the rule of President Laurent Kabila—who had come 
to power in a coup against longstanding dictator Mobutu Sese Seko40—
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia sent their own troops to the DRC in 
August 1998.41 After rebels backed informally by Rwanda and Uganda 
began challenging the Kabila government, Kabila appealed to Southern 
African Development Community leaders for assistance.42 In August 1998, 
 
 37. Adebajo & Keen, supra note 30, at 255. 
 38. See Ismail Rashid, Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front, in IMPUNITY: 
COUNTERING ILLICIT POWER IN WAR AND TRANSITION 191 (Michelle Hughes & Michael 
Miklaucic eds., 2016). 
 39. Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL - Background, supra note 31. 
 40. See Thomas W. Lippman, As Mobutu Topples, U.S. Sees Potential for Similar 
Problems, WASH. POST (May 18, 1997), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/05/18/as-mobutu-topples-us-sees-
potential-for-similar-problems/bceb1cfd-915b-4837-94a3-190dde5727e3/ 
[https://perma.cc/TX5F-B6VS]. 
 41. KATHARINA P. COLEMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT 116 (2007). 
 42. Mel McNulty, From Intervened to Intervenor: Rwanda and Military Intervention in 
Zaire/DRC in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES 173, 183–84 (Oliver Furley & Roy May 
eds., 2001). Rwanda and Uganda were largely responsible for bringing Kabila to power just a 
year prior. Id. at 179–82. But they grew disillusioned with the leader due to his “lethargic 
administration” and his demand for all foreign forces to leave the DRC. Id. at 183. Rwanda 
and Uganda began to create the Congolese Rally for Democracy in August 1998, which 
included members of Congolese opposition groups, defectors from Kabila’s army, and 
reinforcements from Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Id. at 183–84. 
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President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe announced that the Southern African 
Development Community would respond to Kabila’s requests for military 
assistance.43 Meanwhile, Rwanda and Uganda stepped up their support of 
rebels in the eastern part of the country.44 In the words of the Assistant 
Secretary of State Susan Rice, the conflict in the DRC had become the “first 
African world war.”45 By 1999, however, the DRC and five regional states 
signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to bring the conflict to a close. The 
Security Council subsequently established the U.N. Organization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).46 
MONUC arrived in the DRC after the Southern African Development 
Community intervention, but its experience demonstrates the difficulty of 
remaining impartial when it must rely on the host government to execute 
even its modest peacekeeping and post-conflict objectives. When the first 
MONUC observers arrived in country in November 1999, President Kabila 
allowed them to travel to the eastern region around Lake Kivu, the hotbed of 
rebel activity, but barred them from establishing posts in more government-
controlled regions.47 In response, Emile Ilunga—the chief of the Congolese 
Rally for Democracy, a rebel group operating around Lake Kivu—declared, 
“[t]he Lusaka process has been held to ransom by the international 
community and Laurent Désiré Kabila . . . . There is complicity between 
Kabila and the UN . . . .”48 Similarly, Joseph Kabila, who took over the 
presidency after his father was assassinated, promised to “collaborate closely 
with the UN,”49 while increasing arrests of civilian and military citizens of 
Lake Kivu,50 continuing the state’s close ties to Zimbabwe,51 and ultimately 
 
 43. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 120–21. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 121. 
 46. MONUC Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/background.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/MG5K-22EZ]. 
 47. GÉRARD PRUNIER, AFRICA’S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, 
AND THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE 247 (2009) (“When the first MONUC 
observers were deployed in November 1999, they were theoretically allowed in Goma, 
Bukavu, Kisangani, Gbadolite, Lisala, Pepa, Isiro, Kabalo, Bunia, Pweto, Bumba, Kalemie, 
Moba, Kongolo, and Kindu. But they were explicitly barred from Mbandaka, Mbuji-Mayi, 
Lubumbashi, Kananga, Matadi, and Kamina. This meant that Kinshasa accepted the MONUC 
deployment on rebel territory but refused it on its own, particularly in the places where it had 
fighting forces or where it handled military cargo.” (citations omitted)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 258 (quoting Joseph Kabila, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Interim President, in his Inaugural Address on January 26, 2001). 
 50. Id. at 260. 
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dragging his feet in allowing MONUC access to government-held sites for 
disarmament programs.52 
The experience of the U.N. in the DRC shows that a regional actor’s 
involvement as first responder does not necessarily pave the way for an 
impartial, consent-based entrance of the U.N. Rather, the experience of the 
DRC demonstrates that even after MONUC entered the country, the 
Congolese government did not want the U.N. scrutinizing its activities. In 
the face of government recalcitrance, the U.N. faced a difficult choice: either 
enter DRC with the partial mandate of only assessing regions in rebel 
control or refrain from peacekeeping altogether.53 Ultimately, it appears that 
the U.N. chose the former. After 1.7 million deaths between August 1998 
and April 2000,54 the ability to begin U.N. peace operations on the ground 
appeared to be worth the U.N.’s necessary reliance on the autocratic Kabila 
regime. 
Certainly this account does not imply that the U.N. peacekeeping 
mission was as partial as it would have been had the U.N. intervened at the 
outset of hostilities in 1998. The aim of this Section was simply to show that 
U.N. peacekeeping missions, even when intending only to enforce a peace 
settlement, can still end up appearing partial in their mandates because of 
their need to rely on the host government for consent to enter the country 
and for logistical and other support. Thus, the U.N. panel’s proposal to 
delegate peace enforcement to ad hoc coalitions of member states and 
regional organizations will likely result in a marginal increase in U.N. 
impartiality, but will not render U.N. peacekeepers wholly neutral because 
of their inherent need to rely on the host government. 
Furthermore, if the U.N. insists on delegating first responses to 
outbreaks of war to ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional 
organizations, then the international community must be willing to accept 
that such actors often undertake such missions for their own particular 
political motives, a fact that is in tension with the U.N.’s hope that its later 
peacekeeping mandate will appear impartial to the host population. 
Essentially, the U.N. will be delegating to regional entities—that are often 
 
 51. See id. at 269; see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., DISARMAMENT IN THE CONGO: JUMP-
STARTING DDRRR TO PREVENT FURTHER WAR 12 (2001) [hereinafter DISARMAMENT IN THE 
CONGO]. 
 52. DISARMAMENT IN THE CONGO, supra note 51, at 13 (“These suspicions were 
reinforced by the reluctance of the DRC government to provide information on the armed 
groups to the Joint Military Commission or to MONUC, and its opposition to granting 
MONUC access to the Kamina camps, where it claimed to have gathered Hutu fighters since 
April.”); PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 269. 
 53. PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 246–49 (describing this predicament and subsequent 
attempts at U.N. negotiations with the Kabila government). 
 54. Id. at 242. 
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led by autocrats themselves, like the Southern African Development 
Community’s President Mugabe—that are willing to intervene on behalf of 
oppressive governments. The U.N. would also be delegating without any 
semblance of the carrots and sticks that it uses to promote good behavior by 
the host state when the U.N. intervenes on the host state’s behalf. While 
relying on regional organizations as first responders may preserve some 
impartiality in the short-term, it is not clear how long a U.N. mission can 
remain in country without, in practice, bolstering the state government. 
Indeed, as Peter notes, the U.N.’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC has 
morphed to support Joseph Kabila’s efforts to defeat rebels in the eastern 
region surrounding Lake Kivu.55 This raises the question of whether such a 
partial result was inevitable, regardless of the identity of the initial 
responder. 
Additionally, the framework that the U.N. panel proposes would be one 
where “the Security Council should consider other actors . . . as more 
appropriate first responders,”56 which begs the question: How willing is the 
Security Council to endorse member state actions that are executed partially 
due to that state’s interest in gaining regional influence? Peace operations 
deplete intervening states’ resources and open those states up to criticism 
should the mission go awry. The international community should expect that 
a country like Nigeria or Zimbabwe will only volunteer to lead regional 
interventions if it can justify those interventions to their domestic 
populations as being in the national self-interest of the country. Zimbabwe 
may have intervened in the DRC through the Southern African Development 
Community in large part because of its ambitions to create an alliance 
between Zimbabwe and the DRC that would provide a counter-balance to 
South Africa’s regional dominance.57 
Thus, if the Security Council explicitly supports such regional actors by 
delegating to them in Security Council resolutions, as the U.N. panel 
suggests, would that not contradict other U.N. principles? According to 
Peter, “[f]or the entire peacekeeping history, there has been a strong 
reluctance to deploy peacekeepers to areas where they could be seen as 
acting as instruments of their own governments’ policies.”58 The Security 
Council endorsed neither the Economic Community of West African States’ 
 
 55. See Peter, supra note 2, at 354–55. 
 56. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 118. 
 57. COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 136 (“This agenda provided the context for 
Zimbabwe’s decision to intervene in the DRC. The DRC could rival South Africa in 
population and resources, though not in levels of development. After Kabila’s ascent to power 
in 1997, therefore, Zimbabwe hoped for an alliance with the DRC that would help balance 
South Africa’s regional dominance.” (citation omitted)). 
 58. Peter, supra note 2, at 355. 
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interventions in Sierra Leone or Liberia nor the Southern African 
Development Community’s intervention in the DRC. (In fact, the Security 
Council urged all foreign powers to refrain from intervening in the DRC.59) 
This may demonstrate that the U.N. is uncomfortable deferring to regional 
organizations in civil war interventions, because of its hesitation to support 
either the host state’s autocratic regime or the expansionist interests of the 
intervening state, or both. Of course, under international law, such Security 
Council authorizations are not required for a regional or other actor to 
intervene on a state’s behalf when the host state asks for such intervention.60 
But ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional organizations may be 
more prone to respond to peace enforcement needs with the explicit backing 
of the Security Council under its Chapter VIII powers61—authorization that 
the Security Council does not appear prepared to give. 
This history indicates that while the U.N. panel appears to be ready to 
“ruthlessly expose[]”its own shortcomings, including the absence of “fast-
deploying and interoperable forces,”62 it offers little assurance that the U.N. 
will be willing to defer to ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional 
actors in interventions that may be motivated by national interests in 
exerting regional influence and that may often result in supporting an 
autocratic government in its quest to enforce peace in response to 
insurrection by non-state actors. 
II. Other Metrics of Analysis: Command and Control, Conduct, 
and Capacity 
Assessing whether or not the international community should move to a 
model that champions ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional actors 
requires weighing the marginal costs and marginal benefits of other 
important metrics of success beyond simply preserving the credibility of the 
U.N. This Section will examine the proposed change’s likelihood of success 
when examined under the metrics of increased command and control, 
appropriate conduct in the field (i.e., refraining from human rights 
violations), and the capacity to bring the conflict to an end. 
 
 59. Press Release, Security Council, Council Calls for Peaceful Solution to Conflict in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Including Immediate Ceasefire, Withdrawal of Foreign 
Forces, U.N. Press Release SC/6569 (Aug. 31, 1998). 
 60. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 61. Id. at arts. 52–54. 
 62. Rep. of the High-Level Indep. Panel, supra note 1, para. 118. 
12 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 115:1 
 
 
A.  Command and Control 
The U.N. posits that “other actors will more likely have the comparative 
advantage in speed and capability, as well as in command and control 
arrangements necessary to conduct sustained combat operations.”63 The 
evidence of previous ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional actors 
engaging in peace enforcement does support the proposition that such 
missions are executed with increased speed and command and control. For 
example, the Economic Community of West African States’ peace 
enforcement operation in Liberia beginning in August 1990, when 3,500 
West African soldiers deployed to halt an armed rebellion against President 
Samuel Doe, came about through swift Nigerian leadership.64 Within eight 
months of Charles Taylor crossing into Liberia to lead an armed rebellion 
against Doe, the incumbent military leader, Nigeria’s military head of state 
(and a personal friend of Doe’s) was able to martial Nigerian troops under 
the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene.65 By October 1990, the 
ECOMOG troops had taken control of Monrovia, effectively thwarting 
Taylor’s coup attempt.66 (Notably, Nigeria was the largest contributor of 
troops to ECOMOG around this period, supplying roughly 60 to 80 percent 
of its forces between 1991 and 1997.67) This swift response supports the 
argument that states and regional organizations, when motivated to do so, 
can dispatch troops quickly to a volatile conflict zone. 
Even ad hoc coalitions can be deployed swiftly. During the 1997 to 
1998 intervention in the Central African Republic, the ad hoc Mission 
Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui—composed of 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo and financed by 
France—was able to enter the country decisively despite its establishment 
outside the framework of a regional organization. After the situation in the 
Central African Republic significantly deteriorated in 1996, creating fear 
that state collapse would exacerbate regional instability, these African 
countries convened with French support in December 1996 and one month 
later dispatched an inter-African force.68 The French government 
“transported all six contingents to the [Central African Republic] within 
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days,” provided “logistical and tactical support on the ground,” and “paid the 
total food and daily allowances” of all contingents.69 The unified command, 
unity of language between the troops, and dependence on the French appear 
to have provided the groundwork for this efficient operation.70 Remarkably, 
the coalition was able to halt the rebellion and recover 96 percent of heavy 
weapons and 60 percent of light weapons.71 
The Economic Community Of West African States and Mission 
interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui command and control 
structures are particularly appealing when contrasted with the U.N.’s slow 
mobilization. Adekeye Adebajo and David Keen describe the U.N. troops 
that replaced the Economic Community of West African States forces in 
Sierra Leone as “a motley, multinational army—arriving bit by bit, 
underfunded and lacking the necessary equipment.”72 The U.N. 
peacekeeping force in one city, for example, contained twenty-seven 
different nationalities, all lightly armed, and unfamiliar with the terrain.73 In 
sum, under the metric of command and control, decisive regional and ad hoc 
coalitions present an attractive alternative to the slow pace of U.N. dispatch 
and action, thereby supporting the U.N. panel’s proposal. 
B.  Conduct in Peace Enforcement 
The U.N. panel is rightfully concerned about U.N. peace-enforcer 
conduct when troops are deployed in volatile contexts with weak justice and 
security structures. The report states,  
[t]en years after the United Nations began systematically addressing it, 
sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations are continuing, to 
the enduring shame of the Organization, its personnel and the countries 
which provide the peacekeepers who abuse. The deplorable acts of a few 
must not be allowed to drag down the Organization. . . .74 
But delegating to ad hoc coalitions of member states or regional actors, 
as the U.N. panel suggests, may further exacerbate these conduct problems. 
In 1998, when rebel forces launched a brutal attack in Freetown in which 
7,000 people were killed, the Economic Community of West African States 
soldiers themselves began perpetrating significant abuses against civilians in 
the city. Some authors note that such indiscipline may have grown out of the 
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poor pay and conditions of their troops (pay for Economic Community of 
West African States troops is generally lower than that paid to U.N. troops) 
and the troops’ perception of Sierra Leonean civilian “ingratitude” for the 
regional organization’s sacrifices.75 
Additionally, during the Southern African Development Community 
operation in the DRC, Zimbabwe established business interests to 
compensate for the enormous expense of the operation. Zimbabwean 
officials set up a joint venture with counterparts in the DRC to mine 
diamonds, a deal with the DRC to gain millions of hectares in timber, and a 
joint venture between Air Zimbabwe and the Congolese national airline for 
aviation routes across the DRC.76 In addition, an elite network of 
Zimbabwean officials obtained access to diamond, cobalt, copper, and other 
mineral resource sectors.77 In 2002, the U.N. reported: 
Although troops of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces have been a major 
guarantor of the security of the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo against regional rivals, its senior officers have enriched 
themselves from the country’s mineral assets under the pretext of 
arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for military services. Now ZDF is 
establishing new companies and contractual arrangements to defend its 
economic interests in the longer term should there be a complete withdrawal 
of ZDF troops.78 
In Central African Republic, despite the otherwise successful operation 
described in Part I, the Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords 
de Bangui ad hoc coalition committed some serious human rights abuses, as 
the U.S. State Department outlined in its 1997 country report.79 With the 
U.N.’s acknowledgement of its own human rights abuses and retreat from 
peace enforcement altogether, the international community must ask what 
leverage the U.N. will have to condemn such breaches of peace-enforcer 
conduct, and how much weight such condemnation will carry. The human 
rights concerns arising out of regional interventions are a counterweight to 
the benefits of increased command and control. 
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C.  Capacity 
A serious drawback of the recommendation to defer robust peace 
operations to ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations is that states are 
often unwilling, absent explicit national benefits, to engage in peace 
enforcement missions in the first place. The U.N. panel acknowledges this 
issue when it states, “[F]or many crises in the world, those with the greatest 
capability may have limited interest in deploying a sustained military 
presence on the ground . . . .”80 As a result, it states that “the international 
community has looked to deploy United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
the midst of conflict as a crisis response tool.”81 Further, the panel 
acknowledges that regional and sub-regional entities may “bring interests, 
some of which carry potential risks to managing conflict impartially” to the 
peace operation.82 The below Section examines case studies to show how the 
benefits of insulating the U.N. from perceptions of partiality in conflict and 
of swift and decisive actions by regional actors or ad hoc coalitions of 
member states may be offset by the price of truncated or unsuccessful 
missions. 
France, for example, quickly grew flustered with the model used in the 
Central African Republic when it realized that it would be the only Western 
country bearing such a heavy financial burden (roughly US $600,000 per 
month) to sustain the Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de 
Bangui mission.83 The French eventually threatened to withdraw, prompting 
the U.N. to create its own peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission 
in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) to replace the Mission 
Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui in March 1998,84 just 
fourteen months after its initial entry. As another example, British troops 
only intervened in Sierra Leone after over a decade of brutal warfare, 
500,000 Sierra Leonean casualties, and a direct attack on a U.N. mission 
with the kidnapping of U.N. troops, as described in Part I.85 And Nigerian 
leadership decided to pull out of Sierra Leone in May 1999 due to the mass 
unpopularity of the campaign within Nigeria’s populace, which no longer 
wanted to shoulder the burden of US $1 million per day in funds and 
hundreds of deaths for the Economic Community of West African States 
mission.86 
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In fact, regional organizations are more susceptible to capacity 
constraints than the U.N. Unlike the U.N. peacekeeping arrangement 
whereby countries collectively fund troops, regional organizations rely on 
their own members states’ funds and troops. The Southern African 
Development Community, for example, has no effective mechanism for 
promoting financial or military burden-sharing for peace enforcement 
operations.87 During the time of Southern African Development 
Community’s intervention in the DRC and in Lesotho one year later,88 the 
Southern African Development Community’s total annual budget was US 
$16 million.89 South Africa spent US $4 million in the first ten days of the 
Community’s operation in Lesotho alone.90 With member states incurring 
the high costs of peace enforcement operations, it should be unsurprising 
that national interests often govern the length of time that states are willing 
to keep boots on the ground for peace enforcement operations. 
Conclusion 
The recent U.N. panel on Peace Operations report demonstrates a 
current crisis in peace operations: the lack of legitimate actors to execute 
peace enforcement missions. Peter lays the groundwork for discussing the 
alternatives to the U.N. as peace enforcers when she notes that the U.N. and 
member states must either “align the peacekeeping practice more closely 
with the doctrine . . . [or] embrace new practices and provide for a new 
strategic or doctrinal underpinning.”91 The U.N. panel’s inclination to protect 
the U.N.’s credibility by ensuring viable peacekeeping operations that do not 
exceed the bounds of the U.N.’s capacity is understandable. But the on-the-
ground complexities of the current zones of ongoing violence require a 
choice, whether to (1) deploy a cautious international force, (2) defer to an 
ad hoc coalition of member states or a regional organization as the first 
responders, or (3) pursue no peace enforcement operations at all. This Essay 
has sought to show that the U.N. panel’s recommendations must be digested 
not in the abstract, but rather, with an empirical study of the likely results of 
deferring to ad hoc coalitions of member states and regional organizations. If 
the international community chooses this option, it should prepare for fewer 
peace enforcement operations, of shorter duration, and that will be at times 
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motivated by regional politicking. While the operations that do occur will be 
swift and decisive, they will have fewer controls on profiteering and human 
rights abuses and no guarantees as to the length of the mission. 
 
